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$15,000. It also requires a sale of the property by the vendor upon
the vendee's default and a return to the vendee of the sale proceeds
which exceed the unpaid balance of the purchase price. Furthermore,
after the vendee has paid forty per cent of the purchase price he is given
a statutory right to receive a purchase money mortgage for the balance
of the purchase price from the vendor."' These statutory remedies are
but illustrative of the variety of methods which can be adopted to ac-
complish the reform.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the divergence in treatment accorded the land con-
tract and the mortgage is firmly established in Ohio. However, no
logical reason can be offered for the perpetuation of this dichotomy. Be-
cause of historical technicalities and respect for precedents that seem
to overshadow the courts it is unlikely that they will adequately solve
the problem. Legislative recognition of an equity of redemption and
the right to foreclosure proceedings in the land contract vendee is sound
in principle.
The mechanical distinction between the vendee and mortgagor, both
of whom are in default, should no longer be legally countenanced. This
is especially true in light of the great abuses being performed with the
land contract instrument in certain real estate transactions. It should be
clear that if the equity courts of the sixteenth century were capable of pierc-
ing the formality of the common-law mortgage to protect the mortgagor,
surely the enlightened courts of the twentieth century should unhesitat-
ingly do likewise for the vendee under the land contract.
ALAN B. SOCLOF
The Ohio Mortmain Statute-A Need for Reform
Eleven states have statutes which either limit the amount that can be
devised or bequeathed to charities,' or which render such dispositions in-
valid if drawn into the testator's will within a prescribed period of time
before his death,2 or which impose both of these restrictions.8 The Ohio
statute, which is of the second variety, has probably evoked the greatest
criticism and controversy due to the harshness of its provisions and dis-
agreement among the Ohio courts as to its construction and purpose.
The aim of this article, which is a study in comparison of the Ohio
statute with those of the ten other states having such laws, is to expose
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21 §§ 110-16 (1957, Supp. 1961).
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the inequities and inconsistencies of the Ohio statute and to demonstrate
the need for legislative revision.
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH CONCEPTS
Statutes restricting testamentary gifts, while customarily termed mort-
main acts in America, have no significant identification with the English
statutes of mortmain. The earliest mention of mortmain was in the
forty-third clause of Henry III's Second Charter (1217), which sought
to prevent gifts to religious corporations on the grounds that they were
fraudulent and intended to deny the lord his feudal obligations.4 In addi-
tion, conveyances of property to charitable and religious corporations en-
dowed with perpetuity interfered with free alienation of land and pre-
vented escheats to the crown.5
Although the Wills Act of 1837 repealed the existing prohibition
against corporations taking by devise, its effectiveness was diluted by the
statute of 9 George II, c. 36 (1736), entitled the Statute of Mortmain and
Charitable Uses. This latter statute prohibited the gift or conveyance
of real or personal property "to or upon any person or body corporate or
politic, in trust for the benefit of any charitable uses whatever, except by
deed properly executed within twelve months before the death of the
donor."'
Although the influence of the English laws aimed at free alienation
may have given rise to similar legislation in the colonies, the English
statutes themselves were never in force on this side of the Atlantic.7 The
former laws of Mississippi came, perhaps, the closest to those of Eng-
land.8 If these laws were ever considered to exist in Ohio before 1806, it
could only have been by resolution of the territorial governors and
judges.9
The reason for restricting gifts by will for charitable purposes in the
United States was in part motivated by fear that free alienation of lands
would be curtailed, but was mainly to protect certain classes of the testator's
relatives from being excluded from his will by improvident gifts made to
1. Iowa, New York
2. District of Columbia, Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio.
3. California, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana.
4. TASWELL-LANGumAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101-02 (10th ed. 1946).
5. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 495 (1860).
6. RoLLIsoN, WILLS 306-07 (1939).
7. The English case of Attorney General v. Stewart, 2 Mer. 143, 35 Eng. Rep. 895 (1817),
held that none of the English Mortmain Acts were in force in the colonies. See Perin v.
Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 499 (1860).
8. Prior to 1940, the Mississippi Constitution, art. 14, §§ 269 and 270, prohibited unequivo-
cally all devises and bequests for charitable purposes.
9. Case law reveals no particular enactment of the English Mortmain Laws in the Northwest
Territory. See Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 500 (1860).
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charitable institutions while under the apprehension of impending death."0
Whether the purpose of the Ohio statute is solely to protect certain classes
of the testator's relatives has been the subject of conflict among the
courts of Ohio." A full analysis of the Ohio law to date, however, leaves
little doubt that the effect of the statute is not primarily to protect the
heirs of the testator, but to declare gifts within the purview of the act
as void as against public policy.'2 The result is one of discrimination
against charitable institutions in that they do not have the same stand-
ing to take under a will as do private persons and private corporations.
THE OHIO MORTMAIN ACT
The Ohio mortmain statute originated in an 1874 amendment" to
the wills act passed on May 3, 1852. This amendment of 1874 has sur-
vived without substantial change to the present time and is presently
found in Ohio Revised Code section 2107.06, as follows:
If a testator dies leaving issue, or an adopted child, or the lineal descend-
ants of either, and the will of such testator gives, devises, or bequeaths
such testator's estate, or any part thereof, to a benevolent, religious, edu-
cational, or charitable purpose, or to any state or country, or to a county,
municipal corporation, or other corporation, or to an association in any
state or country, or to persons, municipal corporations, or associations in
trust for such purpose, whether such trust appears on the face of the
instrument making such gift, devise, or bequest or not, such will as to
such gift, devise, or bequest, shall be invalid unless it was executed at
least one year prior to the death of the testator.
Three factors set forth by the act must be present before the Ohio
mortmain statute can operate: (1) the decedent must die testate, (2)
within a year of making his will, (3) survived by issue, adopted child,
or by the lineal descendants of either. Where all of these conditions exist,
devises or bequests to charities, either outright, or in trust for charitable
uses, are "invalid."' 4  The gift, if a specific or general devise or bequest,
10. In re Lennon's Estate, 152 Cal. 327, 92 Pac. 870 (1907); Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359,
17 So. 2d 615 (1944); Application of Franklin Nat'l Bank, 4 Misc. 2d 410, 147 N.Y.S.2d 572
(1955); Ruple v. Hiram College, 35 Ohio App. 8 171 N.E. 417 (1928).
11. Thomas v. Trustees of Ohio State University, 70 Ohio St., 92, 70 N.E. 896 (1904), and
Deeds v. Deeds, 94 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950), state that the only purpose of the statute
-was to protect the heirs of the testator; while Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883), Davis
v. Hutchins, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 174 (1897), rev'd., Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E.
317 (1900), Campbell v. Musart Society, 131 N.E.2d 279 (Ohio P. Cr. 1956), and Roenick
v. Dollar Savings and Trust Company, 179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960), recognize that
the Ohio statute not only benefits the heirs of the testator, but that it, in effect, discriminates
against charity and protects others besides testator's issue and lineal descendants.
12. Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883); Davis v. Hutchins, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 174
(1897), rev'd., Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900); Roenick v. Dollar
Sav. & Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Cr. App. 1960).
13. 72 Ohio Laws 3 (1875).
14. OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.06.
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lapses and passes into the residuary clause of the testator's will. 5 Where
there is no residuary clause,"6 or the gift itself consists of the entire resi-
duary clause of the will,' the gift passes as intestate property to the
heirs at law of the testator pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2105.06. Where the gift represents merely a portion of the residue the
same is divided up among the remaining residuary beneficiaries.' 8
OPERATION OF OHIO MORTMAIN ACT
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STATES
The "conditions precedent" to and the resulting effects of the opera-
tion of the mortmain acts vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the
main the differences between the statutes of the eleven states relate to
the following specifics: (1) institutions prohibited from receiving testa-
mentary gifts; (2) requirements as to time; (3) requirements as to
amount; (4) persons ostensibly protected by the statutes; (5) whether
the gifts are void or voidable; (6) parties who may invoke or waive the
benefits of the statutes; and (7) provisions which benefit the charitable
institutions.
Institutions Prohibited from Receiving
Testamentary Gifts
The Ohio act includes the most numerous group of institutions with-
in the purview of its prohibitory provisions - benevolent, religious, edu-
cational, and charitable institutions; county and municipal corporations;
and, any state or country.'" Florida includes all of the above cate-
gories except institutions of higher learning which are specifically ex-
cluded ° Georgia and Mississippi include charitable, religious, educa-
tional or civil institutions,"' while the remainder of the jurisdictions, in
varying degrees, confine the operation of their mortmain acts to charitable
or religious persons or institutions."
15. Davis v. Hutchins, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 174 (1897), rev'd., Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411,
57 N.E. 317 (1900).
16. Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900), held that where the residuary
clause was limited to the "'balance" of the testator's estate, that it was limited in nature, and
gifts which were invalid by operation of the mortmain act, passed as intestate property to the
heirs of the testator.
17. Morgan v. First Natl Bank, 84 Ohio App. 345, 84 N.E.2d 612 (1948).
18. Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (1952).
19. OIno REv. CODE § 2107.06.
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961).
21. GA. CODE ANN. 113-107 (1959); MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 269; Mss. CODE ANN. § 671
(1942).
22. See CAL. PROB. CODE 5 41. Section 42 of the California Code specifically exempts from
the operation of its provisions: "Bequests and devises to or for the use or benefit of the State,
or any municipality, county or political subdivision within the State, or any institution be-
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Requirements as to Time
The Ohio statute provides that charitable gifts shall be "invalid"
if the testator dies within a year of making his will, and is survived by
one of the parties enumerated in the statute 3 This one-year requirement
is considerably longer than the time limitations set up by the eight other
jurisdictions which impose this type of restriction. In these eight juris-
dictions the time varies from six months (Florida)' to ninety days
(Georgia and Mississippi) 25 to thirty days (California, District of Colum-
bia, Idaho, Montana, and Pennsylvania).26 Two states, Iowa and New
York, have no time requirements!' Contrasted with parallel provisions
in the statutes of other states, the one-year requirement of the Ohio
statute is probably its most offensive and highly criticized provision.
Requirements as to Amount
Ohio, like the District of Columbia, Florida, and Pennsylvania,
while invalidating gifts within a certain time period, places no restriction
on the amount which may be given to the institutions enumerated in
the statute in a will executed prior to the time limitation period.' Iowa
and New York, which have no time limitations, restrict charitable gifts
to one-fourth29 and one-half3" of the estate, respectively. California,
Georgia, Idaho, and Mississippi, which invalidate gifts made within
periods ranging from thirty to ninety days, also restrict charitable gifts
made before such periods to one-third of the estate."' Montana, with the
most liberal statute for charities, restricts gifts to one-third of the estate
within its thirty-day prohibitory period, while all gifts made more than
thirty days prior to the death of the testator are valid.'
longing to the State, or belonging to any municipality, county or political subdivision within
the State, or to any educational institution which is exempt from taxation.., or for the use
or benefit of any educational institution .... " See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961);
IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 14-326 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 633.3 (1950); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 91-142 (1947); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 17; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7
(1950).
23. OHIO REv. CODE 5 2107.06.
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961).
25. GA. CODE ANN § 113-107 (1959); MISS. CODE ANN. § 671 (1942).
26. CAL. PROB. CODE § 41; D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. 5
14-326 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §
180.7 (1950).
27. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.3 (1950); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAw § 17.
28. OHIO REV. CODE 5 2107.06; D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
731.19 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
29. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.3 (1950).
30. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 17.
31. CAL. PROB. CODE 5 41; GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
14-326 (1948); MIss. CODE ANN. 5 671 (1942).
32. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947).
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Persons Ostensibly Protected by the Statutes
The persons ostensibly protected by the statutes are those individuals
specifically enumerated within the statutes as surviving the testator.
Whether such enumerated persons are the only ones who are protected
and have standing to object depends upon statutory construction and
judicial decision. In other words, the extent of the class protected de-
pends upon whether the gifts within the statutes are void or voidable.
The Ohio statute, with its provision that the testator must be survived
by "issue, adopted child, or the lineal descendants of either,"' confines
its coverage to the most limited class of persons. In the remaining states
which have such provisions, the protected class of persons is broader.
Depending upon the state, the statute may include the surviving spouse, 4
parent, 5 brother, sister, or nephew or niece of the testator. 6 The statutes
of the District of Columbia, Idaho, Montana, and Pennsylvania impose no
conditions of survivorship which affect the validity of the charitable gift."
From the foregoing it might be concluded that the purpose of those stat-
utes which enumerate persons who must survive the testator is to protect
those specifically named persons, while the purpose of those statutes
which name no individuals is to invalidate certain gifts to charity as
against public policy. Except for Ohio, as will be seen, this conclusion
is true.
Whether the Gifts are Void or Voidable
In determining whether a testamentary gift is void or voidable under
a particular mortmain act, one writer has concluded that under those
statutes which enumerate parties who must survive the testator, the gifts
are voidable, while under those that do not, the gifts are void.!' While
such a conclusion seems logical and practical, a reading of the statute in
Pennsylvania,"9 which does not enumerate parties who must survive the
testator, and a study of the case law in Ohio where the statute does enu-
merate parties, leads one to the conclusion that such a cafagorical general-
ization is fallacious.
33. OHio REv. GODE § 2107.06. Thus designated heirs are not within this specified group.
Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473, 60 N.E. 606 (1901).
34. CAL. PROB. CODE § 41; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961); GA. CODE ANN. §5
113-107 (1959); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.3 (1950); MISS. CODE ANN. § 671 (1942);
N.Y. DEcEDI. EST. LAW § 17. In Ohio the spouse is otherwise protected by being permitted to
take under the statute of descent and distribution if the will has left the surviving spouse less
than half of the net estate. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.39.
35. IowA CODE ANN. § 633.3 (1950); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 17.
36. CAL. PROB. CODE § 41.
37. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-326 (1948); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
38. Note, 50 COLUM. L REV. 94 (1950).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
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If the testamentary gift to charity is void, then it must fail as a result
of the death of the testator. If the gift is merely voidable, then it fails
only if one of the parties protected under the statute objects; if no such
objection is made the statute is deemed waived, and the charitable bequest
is valid.
Of the eleven jurisdictions which have mortmain statutes, Ohio ap-
pears to be the only one in which both the "void" and "voidable" posi-
tions have found acceptance. This confusing situation has resulted from
the lower courts' propensity to hold gifts voidable in contravention to
the Ohio Supreme Court's rulings that such gifts are void. All of the
other jurisdictions have apparently resolved their problems either by
statutory amendment or unequivocal judicial interpretation.
While the Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, and Montana statutes spe-
cifically state that gifts made in contravention of their provisions are
"void, 4  Georgia and Mississippi courts have held that such gifts are
merely voidable,4 and thus, in effect, have interpreted "void" to mean
"voidable."
The District of Columbia statute,' which provides that the gifts are
"invalid," falls into the "void" catagory because it contains (just as the
Idaho and Montana statutes) neither a provision as to persons who must
survive the testator, nor a provision permitting waiver of the gifts.
California,43 Florida,44 Iowa, 5 and New York46 by statutory implica-
tion or court decision have held the gifts to be voidable by the protected
or benefited parties under their statutes.
Pennsylvania, as a result of statutory amendment in 1947, stands in
40. GA. CODE ANN. 5 113-107 (1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-326 (1948); Miss. CODE
A 1 . § 671 (1942); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947). See also White v.
Conference Claimants Endowment Comm., 81 Idaho 17, 336 P.2d 674 (1959); In re Cole-
man's Estate, 66 Idaho 567, 163 P.2d 847 (1945).
41. Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1939) (construing the
Georgia statute); Monahan v. O'Byrne, 147 Ga. 633, 95 S.E. 210 (1918); Bell v. Mississippi
Orphans Home, 192 Miss. 205, 5 So. 2d 214 (1941). This writer, however, would
concur with the reasoning of dissenting Judge Gilbert in the case of Monahan v. O'Byrne, 147
Ga. 633, 634-35, 95 S.E. 210, 211 (1918): "The devise being void ab initio, its invalidity
could not be waived, nor could any act of the beneficiaries after the death of the testator give
it validity."
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-202 (1961).
43. In re Estate of Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 698, 331 P.2d 149 (1958), construed the
present California code section, CAL. PROB. CODE § 41. The former California statute was
almost identical to the one presently in existence in Idaho and provided that a gift to charity
was void. See also In re Garthwaite's Estate, 131 Cal. App. 321, 21 P.2d 465 (1933);
Davidson's Estate, 69 Cal. App. 2d 263, 215 P.2d 504 (1950); In re Bunn's Estate, 33 CaL 2d
897, 206 P.2d 635 (1949); In re Randalls Estate, 86 Cal. App. 2d 422, 194 P.2d 709 (1948).
44. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666, rehearing
denied, 323 U.S. 813 (1944); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961).
45. Karolusson v. Paonessa, 207 Iowa 127, 222 N.W. 431 (1928).
46. N.Y. DECED. EsT. LAW § 17; In re Plaster's Will, 266 App. Div. 439, 43 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1943), aff'd., 293 N.Y. 822, 59 N.E.2d 181 (1944); In re Gaubert's Estate, 164 Misc. 768,
299 N.Y.S. 619 (1937).
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a class somewhat by itself. While a gift made within thirty days of the
testator's death is "void,"4 the statute permits "... all who would benefit
by its invalidity [to] agree that it shall be valid." 8
"Void" or "Voidable" Confusion under the
Ohio Mortmain Act
Early History of the Act - The Omitted Words
The Ohio mortmain act passed in 1874 as an amendment to the
wills act of 1852 specifically provided that charitable gifts made within
the prohibited time period were '"invalid and void."" When this act
was printed in 1874 as section 5915, Revised Statutes, it was entitled,
"Any bequest or devise to charitable purpose, if any issue of testator liv-
ing, void, unless made one year before his death." But the words "and
void" for some reason disappeared from the body of the statute so that
it provided only that charitable gifts within one year of the testator's
death were "invalid." It cannot be discovered where or why those words
were omitted; it is mere conjecture that they were so omitted either be-
cause of redundancy, or because of the desire to change the meaning of
the section. Semantically, there is no difference between the word "in-
valid" and the word "void." Subsequent sections of the Ohio General
Code5" and the present section 2107.06 of the Revised Code, entitled "Be-
quests to Charitable Purpose," state only that the gifts are "invalid."
Supreme Court Cases Construing Gifts Under the Act as Void
Certainly it is questionable that the omission of the word "void"
from the statute has caused the apparent disagreement among the Ohio
courts as to the gift being void or voidable. In Patton v. Patton51 in
1883, the earliest of seven cases in which the Supreme Court of Ohio
construed the Ohio mortmain act, the court held that the charitable
bequests made within a year of the death of the testator "became abso-
lutely void immediately at and after the death of the testator." Some
difficulty was subsequently caused by the decisions of the supreme court in
the cases of The Trustees of Ohio State University v. Folsom 2 in 1897
and Thomas v. The Trustees of Ohio State University" in 1904. Both of
47. In re Estate of Rhodes, 399 Pa. 476, 160 A.2d 532 (1960); McGuigen's Estate, 388
Pa. 475, 131 A.2d 124 (1957); In re H-artman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 At. 234 (1936).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 S 180.7 (1950).
49. 72 Ohio Laws 3 (1875).
50. OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504, 10504-5.
51. 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883).
52. 56 Ohio St. 701, 47 N.E. 581 (1897).
53. 70 Ohio St. 92, 70 N.E. 896 (1904).
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these cases dealt with the construction of a will left by the same testator
who died within a year of executing his will and codicil. In his will the
testator made a devise to Ohio State University, but provided that if for
any reason the gift should fail, it should then pass to the children of his
brothers. In his subsequent codicil, the testator gave his daughter the
power to appoint the devise to the University, if it became void, and
thereby cut off the gift to the children of his brothers. At the death of
the testator within a year of making his will and codicil, his daughter
exercised her power of appointment. The supreme court held that
the power to appoint did not fall within the purview of the statute,
and the devise went to the University. Some discussion by the court of
the power to waive the statute caused confusion in later cases.
The cases of Davis v. Davis54 in 1900 and Theobald v. Fugman?
in 1901 both held that gifts made within the statutory period were void.
The case of Barrett v. Delmore" in 1944 did not consider the "void
versus voidable" question but dealt solely with the issue of whether a
designated heir was within the classes specified by the statute as surviving
the testator.
If there was any doubt created as to whether charitable gifts were
void or voidable under the Ohio statutes, the most recent case decided by
the supreme court in 1951, Kirkbridge v. Hickok," seems to have an-
swered it.58 The testator in this case died within a year of making his
will. The will placed substantially his entire estate in trust for twenty
years, with provision for the payment of income during such period to
his children and certain other persons. At the end of twenty years the
trust was to terminate and be divided among some twenty charities. An
in terrorem clause in the will provided that the children would forfeit
all their interests if they contested the provisions of the will. This put
the controversy of "void versus voidable" squarely in issue. If the
gift were voidable, then action by the children would invoke the in
terrorem clause,59 while inaction would constitute a waiver of the stat-
ute's provisions0 0 On the other hand, if the gift were void, then action
by the children would not invoke the in terrorem clause, because the gift
54. 62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900).
55. 64 Ohio St. 473, 60 N.E. 606 (1901).
56. 143 Ohio St. 203, 54 N.E.2d 789 (1944).
57. 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951).
58. For criticism of this case as going beyond the statutory purpose, see 65 HARv. L. REv.
1074 (1951).
59. The result here would be that the other beneficiaries would receive the entire income
for twenty years and the children would have a vested remainder.
60. The result here would be the same as the provision of the will, that is, the children and
other beneficiaries would receive the income for twenty years, and the charities receive a
vested remainder in the principal.
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would fail automatically at the death of the testator.61 The court in hold-
ing that the gifts were void, stated:
The language of this section is dear and unambiguous. Invalid means
void, or without validity, and it seems obvious that if children of the
blood take under the will just as it provides, and have done nothing
themselves to bring about the invalidity of the bequests to the charities,
they can not be said to have waived the provisions of the statute ....
The court went on to distinguish Thomas v. The Trustees of Ohio State
University and The Trustees of Ohio State University v. Folsom on the
ground that the naked power to appoint is not covered by the statute. 2
Lower Court Cases Construing Gifts Under the Act as Voidable
The conflict in the Ohio position as to the "void versus voidable"
question arises from two probate court decisions (and, perhaps, also from
two tax court decisions"). The first of these two probate court decisions,
Deeds v. Deeds,4 decided in Montgomery County in 1950, involved a
devise by codicil to Denison University which failed because the codicil
was executed within a year of the date of testatrix's death. Testatrix's
husband was the residuary beneficiary under her will, and her son was
substitute residuary beneficiary if her husband failed to survive the testa-
trix. After testatrix's death, her son signed a waiver relinquishing and
disclaiming his rights under the statute to the property devised to the
charity. In a will construction action filed by the husband as executor,
the court held that the gift was voidable rather than void. Accordingly,
said the court, the son, who was a protected party under the statute, had
by his waiver effectuated the gift to the University. This case was never
appealed.
The second case, Ireland v. Cleveland Trust Company, 5 decided in
1958 by Judge Walter Kinder of the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County,
involved a devise of over a million and one-half dollars to charity.
Testatrix was survived by her son, the sole heir at law and residuary lega-
tee under her will, who was willing to waive the benefits of the statute
61. The result here as determined by the court in the Kirkbridge case was that the children
and other beneficiaries received the income for twenty years, and the children had a vested
remainder.
62. Subsequent to the Kirkbridge case, the Court of Appeals of Mahoning County, Ohio,
decided the case of Roenick v. Dollar Savings and Trust Company, 179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1960). In that case the testator, within the year of his death, drafted a will leaving the
residue to his grandson on the condition that he pay certain sums of money to certain charities.
The court upheld the gift of the residue to the grandson, but without citation of authority,
held that the condition was invalid as coming within "the plain, and unambiguous, terms" of
the mortmain act.
63. Estate of Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941); Estate of William A. Carey, 9 T.C.
1047 (1947).
64. 94 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950).
65. 157 NE.2d 396 (Ohio P. Ct. 1958).
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if a waiver was legally possible. The court, "distinguishing" the Kirk-
bridge case without elaboration, held that the law of Ohio permitted
and authorized a waiver, and therefore the gift to charity was valid. This
case, as the Deeds case, was never appealed, and thus both appear to
have been friendly lawsuits, aimed perhaps at saving taxes.6
Both of these cases are contrary to the law as interpreted by the
supreme court, for the Ohio statute and the weight of case law interpret-
ing it are clear in holding that testamentary gifts made in prohibition of
the statute are void as against public policy.6"
Parties Who Can Invoke or Waive
the Benefits of the Statute
Who can invoke the operation of a particular statute where the statute
does not set forth particular persons who must survive the testator?
Where the statute does enumerate persons who must survive the testator
for the statute to operate, can only those persons question the validity of
the charitable bequest, or can any person who might benefit from the
invalidity of the gift contest it?
In all of the states in which no class of persons are specified by the
statute,68 testamentary gifts to charity have been held to be void. Upon
the death of the testator, such gifts pass to either successor legatees and
devisees, residuary beneficiaries, or the heirs at law of the testator depend-
ing upon the particular provision of the will which is void. Therefore,
any interested person can contest the validity of the gift. Only Pennsyl-
vania, by a 1947 amendment to its statute, permits the gift to be validated
by all the persons who would be benefited by its invalidity.69
66. See Estate of Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B.T.A. 691 (1941); Estate of William A. Carey, 9
T.C. 1047 (1947); Milliard v. Humprey, 8 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Wash. 1934), aff'd, 79
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1935). Internal Revenue Code of 1954 section 2055(a) provides: "In
General - For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate
shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate the amount of all bequests,
legacies, devises, or transfers (including the interest which falls into any such bequest, legacy,
devise, or transfer as a result of an irrevocable disclaimer of a bequest, legacy, devise, transfer,
or power, if the disclaimer is made before the date prescribed for the filing of the return) ...
(2) to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes... " Thus, if a waiver of a charitable
bequest is valid, there is a substantial saving in estate tax, for the amount of the charitable
bequest can be deducted from the estate before computing the estate tax.
67. The theory that such testamentary gifts are void as against public policy is succinctly set
forth in Kirkbridge v. Hickok, 155 Ohio St. 293, 300, 98 N.E.2d 815, 819, as follows: "In
none of these cases has the statute been treated otherwise than as a limitation on the power of
the testator to make charitable bequests, where the testator dies within a year after making
his will, and all hold that property so devised or bequeathed does not under such circumstances
pass to charitable institutions."
68. The states having this type of statute are the District of Columbia, Idaho, Montana, and
Pennsylvania. See D.C. Code Ann. § 19-202 (1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. 14-326 (1948);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950).
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (1950). See McGuigen's Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 131 A.2d
124 (1957), which discusses generally the purpose of the 1947 amendment.
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In the rest of the states, except Ohio, where the statutes enumerate
certain classes of persons who must survive the testator for the charitable
gifts to be invalid, it has been held that only those persons can exercise
the right to invoke the statute, and that if they fail to contest the gifts,
then the provisions of the statute are waived. Thus, in Georgia and Mis-
sissippi, where the statutes provide that gifts within the statutory provi-
sions are "void,"7" the courts have held that "void" means "voidable" and
only persons named in the statute can invoke its provisions.7' California,
Florida, and New York specifically state that gifts made in contravention
of their statutes can only be contested by those parties enumerated therein.
The gifts are valid and the statutes are waived if there is no contest.72
The same result has been reached by court decision in Iowa."
While the Ohio statute is similar to those of the latter group, the
same Ohio courts which have disagreed as to whether gifts made in con-
travention of the statute are void or voidable, have also, as to be expected,
disagreed over which parties have the standing to attack the validity of
such gifts. The supreme court in Patton v. Patton,"4 which involved a
partition action brought by the brother of the decedent, held that since
the gift was void any one interested in the descent and distribution could
assert the invalidity of the bequest. Thus, the brother, who was not with-
in any class enumerated within the statute, had the right to attack the
charitable gift. In a later case decided by the Ohio Circuit Court of
Cuyahoga County, 5 it was held that any party interested in the estate
could object.
In contrast, the cases of Deeds v. Deeds"6 and Ireland v. Cleveland
Trust Company," which stated that the gifts under the statute were void-
able, held that only persons named in the statute could invoke its pro-
tection, and that there could be no attack on the gift unless the declared
purpose of the statute would be served. As stated previously, the waivers
in these cases in favor of the charities were held to be valid, but neither
case was appealed.
70. GA. CODE ANN. 5 113-107 (1959); MIss. CODE ANN. § 671 (1942).
71. Monahan v. O'Byrne, 147 Ga. 633, 95 S.E. 210 (1918); Bell v. Mississippi Orphans
Home, 192 Miss. 205, 5 So. 2d 214 (1941).
72. CAL. PROB. CODE § 41; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. DECED. EST.
LAw § 17. See also Iti re Bunn's Estate, 33 Cal. 2d 897, 206 P.2d 635 (1949); Taylor v.
Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944); 1I re Plaster's Will, 266 App. Div. 439, 43
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1943), afl'd., 293 N.Y. 822, 59 N.E.2d 181 (1944).
73. Karolusson v. Paonessa, 207 Iowa 127, 222 N.W. 431 (1928).
74. 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883).
75. Davis v. Hutchins, 15 Ohio C.C.R. 174 (1897), rev'd ol; other grounds, Davis v. Davis,
62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317 (1900). The grounds for reversal were that the residuary
clause of the will was limited in nature, and therefore the void bequests to charity went by the
law of intestate succession.
76. 94 N.2d 232 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950).
77. 157 N.E.2d 396 (Ohio P. Ct. 1950).
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Thus, while the position of the Supreme Court of Ohio is dear -
testamentary gifts, coming within the provisions of the statute, are void
at the death of the testator and can be attacked by any interested or bene-
fited party - this position is illogical and completely out of step with
similar legislation in other states. Why would the Ohio legislature have
enumerated certain classes of persons who must survive the testator for
the statute to operate, if it did not intend to protect only these classes?
DOCTRINES PERMITTING AVOIDANCE
OF HARSH EFFECTS OF MORTMAIN ACTS
A number of doctrines which reduce the hardship of the mortmain stat-
utes have been incorporated into statutes or adopted by judicial decision.
One of these is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Another
is the doctrine of independent legal significance.7
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation operates where the
testator has executed a will prior to the statutory time limitation set forth
in a particular mortmain act leaving gifts to charity, and later, during the
statutory prohibited time period, executes a new will or codicil which
either expressly or impliedly revokes or modifies the prior will, and which
names the same or similar charity and gives the same or different amounts
of money to those charities. As previously discussed, the gifts made to
charities within the prohibited time periods are void or voidable if left
to charity, and the requisites of the particular statutes have been met.
However, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation operates to vali-
date the charitable gifts in the prior will, on the ground that it was the
testator's intention that the revocation of the gift in the prior will was
conditioned upon the validity of the subsequent will or gifts.79 Further,
if the gifts are invalid under the second will, the condition has not been
met, and thus the gifts under the prior will are still in effect. Thus as
succinctly stated by the court In re Kaufman's Estate:?'
Under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, an earlier will, re-
voked only to give effect to a later one on the supposition that the later
one will become effective, remains in effect to the extent that the later
proves ineffective.... The doctrine is designed to carry out the probable
intention of the testator when there is no reason to suppose that he
intended to revoke his earlier will if the later will became inoperative.
78. Further statutory aids to charities are provided in the Florida and Georgia statutes. The
Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (Supp. 1961), requires that those persons named
within it must file notice within eight months after the death of the testator in order to invoke
its protection. The Georgia statute, GA. CoDE ANN. § 113-107 (1959), provides that when
the estate exceeds $200,000 the restrictions shall not apply to the excess.
79. See Annot., 28 A.LR.2d 526, 532 (1953).
80. 25 Cal. 2d 854, 859, 155 P.2d 831, 834 (1945).
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The various courts which apply the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation to such situations have adopted different standards. Thus,
some courts81 refuse to apply the doctrine where there is an express clause
of revocation, stating that such a clause is controlling. Others" will
apply the doctrine even when the revocation clause has been inserted,
stating that the intention of the testator is paramount to the words used
in his will. Further, where the second will contains no express clause of
revocation, but the clauses of the second will are inconsistent with those
of the first, the courts are split in decision.
Some of the courts have held that the second will does not revoke the first,
since it is truly the inconsistency between the gifts in the two instru-
ments which affords any grounds for claiming revocation, and since the
gifts in the second will are not operative, the first instrument is not affected
by the second. Other courts hold that the testator intends to revoke the
first instrument, as is indicated by the inconsistent gifts in the second in-
strument; and effect must be given to this intention even though the
gifts which are made by the second instrument cannot take effect.8s
The application of the doctrine can best be illustrated by several
cases. In In re Kaufman's Estate"' the testator, upon moving from New
York to California, drafted a new will revoking all his former wills. This
new will named the same charitable beneficiaries as his former will and
provided for identical cash bequests. The only substantial change was the
naming of a new executor. The testator died within thirty days of the
execution of this new will. Under California law testamentary gifts to
charity are invalid if the will providing for them was executed within
thirty days of the testator's death. The California court, applying the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation, sustained the gifts to charity
under the prior will stating:
When a testator repeats the same dispositive plan in a new will, revoca-
tion of the old one by the new is deemed inseparably related to and
dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the new.8 5
In the case of Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation,s"
the testator executed a second will revoking his first will, but provided
in the residuary clause of the second for distribution to the same charities
as in the residuary clause of the first. The testator died within one month
81. Ely v. Megie, 219 N.Y. 112, 113 NE. 800 (1916).
82. Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
It re Kaufman's Estate, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945); Blackford v. Anderson, 226
Iowa 1138, 286 N.W. 735 (1939); McGuigens Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 131 A.2d 124 (1957).
See also In re Blankenship's Estate, 22 So. 2d 466 (la. 1960); Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 1iss.
205 (1881).
83. 2 PAGE, WiLLs § 21.57 (rev. ed. 1960).
84. 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945).
85. Id. at 860, 155 P.2d at 834.
86. 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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of executing his second will, making such charitable bequests void under
the District of Columbia Code. The court of appeals, citing the Kaufman
case with approval, applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
to uphold the gifts and stated:
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is basically an application
of the rule that a testator's intention governs; it is not a doctrine defeat-
ing that intent.8 7
The same result was reached by an Iowa court in Blackford v. An-
derson,8" holding that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation was
applicable so as to give effect to the thrice declared intent of the testator.
Several states have, by statute, incorporated into their mortmain acts
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in order to avoid the effects
of the mortmain provisions. Thus, in 1957, as a result of In re Pratt's
Estate," in which a Florida court refused to apply the doctrine in a
case similar to the Kaufman and Linkin decisions where a subsequent
will revoked all prior wills of the testator, the Florida Legislature
amended section 731.19 of its statutes to provide that charitable gifts are
not voidable if
... testator, by his will duly executed immediately next prior to such
last will and more than six months before his death, made a valid charit-
able bequest or devise in substantially the same amount for the same
purpose or to the same beneficiary, or to a person in trust for the same
person or beneficiary as was made in such last will.
Another comprehensive incorporation of the doctrine into a mortmain
statute was accomplished by Pennsylvania in section 180.7 of its statutes.
This section in part provides:
Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or codicil shall re-
voke or supersede a prior will or codicil executed at least thirty days
before the testator's death, and not theretofore revoked or superseded
and the original of which can be produced in legible condition, and if
such instrument shall contain an identical gift for substantially the same
religious or charitable purpose, the gift in the later will or codicil shall
be valid; or if each instrument shall give for substantially the same
religious or charitable purpose a cash legacy or a share of the residuary
estate or a share of the same asset, payable immediately or subject to
identical prior estates and conditions, the later gift shall be valid to the
extent to which it shall not exceed the prior gift.
Following the amendment of the Pennsylvania statute, McGuigen's
Estate ° was decided. In that case the testator died five days after execut-
ing a new will which specifically revoked all prior wills. This new will
left all the residue absolutely to a charity, while a former will executed more
87. Id. at 360.
88. 226 Iowa 1138, 286 N.W. 735 (1939).
89. 88 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1956).
90. 388 Pa. 475, 131 A.2d 124 (1957).
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-than thirty days prior to decedent's death had left all the residue in trust
for the same charity. The court in upholding the charitable gift stated:
Prior to the Act of 1947 the law of Pennsylvania was dearly settled that
the residuary gift contained in testatrix's last will of 1955 was void
[because of testatrix's death within 30 days] ....
The reason for the law prior to 1947 was dear. The basic purpose of the
30 day requirement was and is to prevent a testator during his last illness
from being importuned or otherwise influenced, by hope of reward or
fear of punishment in the hereafter, to leave his estate in whole or in part
to charity or to church. Since it would often be difficult to prove
whether a man was in his last illness, or whether he had been importuned,
or was unduly influenced by charity or church, or was influenced while
in extremis by sudden hope of Heaven or fear of Hades, the Legislature
wisely established a dear, realistic and inflexible time period - 30 days.
However, society came to realize that gifts to charity or church which
were made within the last 30 days of a man's life were not always unduly
influenced by charity or church and that the law was unfair to testators,
charity and church alike for the above mentioned reason, as well as
because of the fact that while in good health a testator might die in a
motor, railroad or plane accident within 30 days after making his will.
The legislature therefore decided that the prior statutory law in re
charitable gifts should be modified and liberalized and that gifts to
charities which were made within 30 days of death should, at least to
a limited extent, be protected and validated where the testator had made
a substantially identical charitable gift in a prior extant will. 1
Thus, the Pennsylvania Legislature came to recognize some of the
inherent problems which resulted from a harsh and antiquated law and
corrected them by adopting a modern and liberal approach.
But, while California, District of Columbia, Iowa, Florida, Missis-
sippi, and Pennsylvania, by decision or statute, have adopted to a greater
or lesser degree the doctrine of dependent relative revocation to ease the
burden of of their mortmain acts, the Ohio Supreme Court in the recent
case of Jewish Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. The Cleveland Trust
Company,"2 refused to apply the doctrine. Such a refusal is certainly not
inconsistent with the harsh position taken by the Ohio courts in rebuffing
any attempt to modify the effects of its mortmain statute.
Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance
While all apparent attempts to modify the effect of the Ohio mort-
main act on testamentary dispositions?3 have been thwarted by the Ohio
91. Id. at 477-79, 131 A.2d at 126, 127.
92. Cuyahoga County P. Ct No. 554490 (Ohio 1960), affd., Cuyahoga County Ct. App.
No. 25339 (Ohio 1961), motion to certify overruled, Sup. Ct. No. 37084 (Ohio 1961). This
case was unreported and therefore can be cited only by its docket numbers.
93. Kirkbridge v. Hickok, 155 Ohio St. 293, 98 N.E.2d 815 (1951); Barrett v. Delmore,
143 Ohio St. 203, 54 NXE.2d 789 (1944); Davis v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 411, 57 N.E. 317
(1900); Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio St. 590 (1883); Roenick v. Dollar Say. & Trust Co.,
179 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 Ohio App. 345, 84
N.E.2d 612 (1948); Harrison v. Hillegas, 1 Ohio Supp. 160 (Ohio P. Ct 1939).
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courts and legislature, the Ohio courts have held that inter vivos trusts
with charitable beneficiaries are not void if created within a year of a
testator's death. 4 Because of this approach the implications of a recently
passed statute, Ohio Revised Code section 2107.63, may cause some
surprising results.
Formerly, where a testator provided in his will that the residue of
his estate "pour over" into a pre-existing inter vivos trust, for such a gift
to be valid, the trust had to be incorporated by reference, pursuant to
Ohio Revised Code section 2107.05, into the testator's will.95 Any sub-
sequent amendments to the trust also had to be incorporated into the
testator's will by codicil for the property passing from the estate into
the trust to go according to the terms of the trust as amended." Thus,
in Cleveland Trust v. White,"7 decided prior to Ohio Revised Code sec-
tion 2107.63, and pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 2107.05, where
the testator created an inter vivos trust within a year of the date of his
death with charitable beneficiaries and incorporated the same by refer-
ence into his will executed thereafter, the court held that while the
property transferred during life to the trust passed to charity, property
which passed into the trust from testator's will did not pass to charity
because the same was a testamentary disposition within the prohibition of
the mortmain act.
However, with the passage of section 2107.63, the Ohio Legislature
recognized the doctrine of "independent legal significance," which pro-
vides in substance that an intervivos trust stands independently of a will
of a testator, and that once the trust has been referred to in the will, sub-
sequent amendments to the trust do not have to be referred to in the
will.9" The result of this doctrine is that, without testamentary disposi-
tion, the residue of the testator's estate "pours over" into his inter vivos
trust as amended.
The doctrine of independent legal significance coupled with the
approach of the Ohio courts in upholding inter vivos trusts for the benefit
of charities produces an interesting result which can be illustrated as
follows: X draws a will in July of 1961 and provides therein that the
residue of his estate shall "pour over" into P inter vivos trust created
in June of 1961; X amends his trust in January of 1962 by changing
the beneficiaries to charitable institutions without changing his will; if
X dies in March of 1962, the gifts to the charities are valid, even if
X is survived by issue, adopted children, or lineal descendants thereof, be-
94. Drew v. Richards, 177 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Cleveland Trust Co. v.
White, 58 Ohio App. 339, 16 N.E.2d 588 (1937).
95. Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944).
96. Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 44 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
97. 58 Ohio App. 339, 16 N.E.2d 588 (1937).
98. OHio REV. CODE § 2107.63 (Supp. 1961).
[VoL- 13:3
Ohio Mortmain Statute
cause the amendment of his trust is not a testamentary disposition so as to
come within the purview of Ohio Revised Code section 2107.06, -the
Ohio mortmain act. In reality what the testator is doing is devising or
bequeathing property to charity and accomplishing such during the year
of his death.
Whether the Ohio Legislature was aware of this interesting result
when it passed section 2107.63 is a matter of conjecture.
A NEED FOR CHANGE IN OHIO
Since 1874, when the mortmain statute was first passed in Ohio,
until the present time, there have been no more than two dozen reported
cases dealing with the act; of these cases, only seven have reached the
supreme court. While the supreme court cases are consistent in holding
that the gifts coming within the statute are void, and that any interested
person can raise the issue, some lower courts have felt free to alter the
meaning of the act when the equities of the situation favor upholding the
gift and the issue, lineal descendents, or adopted children raise no objec-
tion.
One reason, perhaps, for the sparsity of cases, is the fact that testator's
attorney has several tools at his disposal which he can use to thwart the
statute. The best tool available, and probably the most frequently used, is
the inter vivos trust properly drawn so as not to be testamentary in
character. If such a trust is not construed as a testamentary disposition
of property, it does not come within the purview of the mortmain stat-
ute. 9 This device can now be coupled with a "pour-over" trust provision
in a will under Ohio Revised Code section 2107.63. A second available
tool is the bequest to a compliant relative or friend of a power to ap-
point00 certain property of the decedent to a named charity in the event
that a direct bequest to that charity is held invalid under the mortmain
act. A further possibility is the use of a joint bank account with right
of survivorship in the name of the donor and the charity he wishes to
benefit.''
Thus, the Ohio statute, as it stands today, has only limited application.
Yet, in those cases in which it does operate there are bound to be harsh
99. Drew v. Richards, 177 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Cleveland Trust Co. v.
White, 58 Ohio App. 339, 16 N.E.2d 588 (1937). See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co.
v. Charity Organization Soc., 238 App. Div. 720, 265 N.Y.S. 267, aff'd., 264 N.Y. 441, 191
N.E. 504 (1933); Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193
P.2d 721 (1948).
100. For two early cases holding that a bequest of a power to appoint to charity does not
fall within the mortmain act, see Thomas v. The Trustees of Ohio State University, 70 Ohio
St. 92, 70 N.E. 896 (1904), and The Trustees of Ohio State University v. Folsom, 56 Ohio
Sr 701 (1897).
101. A second reason for the lack of cases may be due to the testator's fear of the provisions
of the statute itself, which have caused him to reconsider his plan of testamentary disposition.
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and inequitable results. The statute as construed establishes a conclusive
presumption of "indue influence"'102 even in a situation where such pre-
sumption could be effectively rebutted.' Further, the statute as con-
strued is not only inconsistent with similar legislation in other states
but also appears not in harmony with its purpose. While enumerating
certain classes of persons who are ostensibly to be protected from improvi-
dent gifts of the testator, the courts interpret the act for the benefit of
other classes and hold that gifts to charity are void as against public
policy. All that can be said for the majority of Ohio courts that so hold
is that they have been, if not logical, at least consistent among themselves.
The need for statutory aid to certain classes of the testator's heirs,
however, is not recognized by the great majority of states. Of the eleven
states which place some limitation on charitable bequests and devises,
the Ohio statute is the most severe because under it all testamentary gifts
to charities made within one year of the testator's death are void. It is for
these reasons that the writer agrees with those who find the statute not
only harsh, but obsolete and who advocate its repeal.
RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROPOSALS
From 1953 to 1957, the Probate and Trust Committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association considered legislative changes in Ohio's mortmain
statute. During this time a subcommittee was appointed to study the
problem. A majority of this committee was of the opinion that the
statute no longer served any useful purpose and that it should be abol-
ished. They felt that it impaired proper estate planning especially as
related to those problems created by rapid changes in tax laws and estate
conditions.
Since there was apparent opposition by the Council of Delegates of
the Ohio Bar Association to total abolition of the statute, however, the
committee proposed as a compromise measure, that the time period be
reduced from one year to thirty days. Other suggested changes which
were considered were a limit as to the amount which could be devised or
bequeathed to charities, and an amendment making gifts under the statute
voidable only at the instance of parties enumerated within the statute.
The committee in making this proposal expressed its belief that gifts un-
der the present statute were void and not voidable. When the proposed
change to a thirty-day time limitation was presented, it also met with
strong opposition from the Council of Delegates of the Ohio State Bar.
Much of this resistance came from representatives from rural counties.
102. OHio REV. CODE § 2107.06. See Roenick v. Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d
379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
103. Sudden fatalities arising from automobile accidents or airplane crashes provide one
example where there can be no suggestion of undue influence.
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Due to this opposition, consideration of the amendment was dropped by
the Ohio State Bar Committee."4
In the past several years both the Cleveland and the Cuyahoga County
Bar Associations, as well as others, have considered changes in the statute.
These suggested changes follow closely the proposals made by the Pro-
bate and Trust Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association - changes
as to the time limitation, as to limitations on the amount which the
charities could take, and a change making the gifts voidable rather than
void.105
At the present time there is little, if any, action for legislative amend-
ment or abolition of the mortmain statute. However, a harsh result in
the recent case of The Jewish Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Trust Company " again illustrates the need for changing the stat-
ute.
1°7
RICHARD W. SCHWARTZ
104. This information was secured through the courtesy of Richard F. Sater, Chairman of
the Probate and Trust Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association.
105. This information was provided by R. T. Sawyer, Jr., former Chairman of the Probate
and Trust Committee of the Cleveland Bar Association, and Ellis V. Rippner, Chairman of
the Probate and Trust Committee of the Cuyahoga Bar Association.
106. Cuyahoga County P. Ct. No. 554490 (Ohio 1960); aff'd., Cuyahoga County Ct. App.
No. 25339 (Ohio 1961), motion to certify overruled, Sup. Ct. No. 37084 (Ohio 1961).
107. The status of the present Ohio mortmain act can be summarized by the words of Judge
Frank J. Merrick, Probate Court of Cuyahoga County, in his unreported opinion in the case
of Jewish Welfare Federation of Cleveland v. Cleveland Trust Company, Ibid.: "The writer of
this opinion has advocated the repeal of this so-called mortmain statute and is of the belief
that the same is unrealistic and penalizes worthy religious organizations in undue fashion."
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